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To Win Friends and Influence  
People: Regulation and Enforcement 
of Influencer Marketing After Ten 
Years of the Endorsement Guides 
Craig C. Carpenter & Mark Bonin II* 
ABSTRACT 
For the last ten years, social media influencer marketing has been 
regulated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under the FTC’s 
Section 5 “unfair practices” authority, guided by the Endorsement 
Guides, a “best practices” document published by the FTC. This is  
a fairly “light” regulatory scheme where violators typically enter  
no-money, no-fault consent decrees and generally undertake to do a 
better job following the Endorsement Guides in the future. During  
this time, the practice has flourished, and companies are spending 
significant portions of their marketing budgets on social media 
influencer advertising. Recently, the FTC has submitted proposals for 
increased enforcement and penalties in this space based on a belief that 
misinformation is plaguing the internet.  
This Article reviews the history of influencer marketing and 
examines the current regulatory regime. This Article contends that the 
current regime, while not perfect, is preferable to a strict rule-based 
approach with substantial penalties due to the evolving nature of social 
media and consumer perception in this area.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“In the future, everyone will be world-famous for 15 minutes.” 
–Andy Warhol1 
 
Social media has forever changed digital advertising. Because 
people are spending less and less time watching live television and 
reading print media in favor of spending more time on their 
smartphones, brands have been forced to find new ways to connect with 
consumers. To do this, brands frequently turn to individual social  
media users who can push brand messaging to their followers. 
Typically, influencer-sponsored brand messages are more authentic 
than traditional advertising because they connect with targeted 
demographics on a more personal level.  
Increased brand interest in influencer marketing is also creating 
a viable occupation for entrepreneurial millennials and zoomers. Gone 
are the days when only celebrities and professional athletes received 
endorsement deals. Boosted by influencer platforms like RewardStyle2 
and influencer agencies like the Influencer Marketing Agency3  
and Viral Nation,4 otherwise “regular” people can use social media 
 
 1. Quote widely attributed to Andy Warhol. See, e.g., Tony Bravo, ‘World-famous for 15 
minutes’: How Andy Warhol Predicted the Cult of Personality and Social Media Age, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE DATEBOOK (May 13, 2019), https://datebook.sfchronicle.com/art-exhib-
its/world-famous-for-15-minutes-how-andy-warhol-predicted-the-social-media-age-and-cult-of-
personality (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).   
 2. REWARDSTYLE, https://rewardstyle.com/ [https://perma.cc/22YP-JETP] (last visited 
Dec. 4, 2020). RewardStyle is a Dallas-based company that aids influencers in managing and  
monetizing content. See id. 
 3. INFLUENCER MKTG. AGENCY, https://imagency.com/about [https://perma.cc/82DQ-
2PJV] (last visited Dec. 4, 2020). 
 4. VIRAL NATION, https://viralnation.com/ [https://perma.cc/CB4Z-Y5F6] (last visited 
Dec. 4, 2020); see Chavie Lieber, How and Why Do Influencers Make So Much Money? The Head of 
an Influencer Agency Explains, VOX (Nov. 28, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/the-
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platforms to fund their creative endeavors and earn income. While  
not all social media users have the voice or reach to lure brand 
sponsorships, even social media users who have just a few thousand 
followers5—a relatively small audience by industry standards—can 
turn their platforms into lucrative brand partnerships by leveraging a 
particular type of content or audience of followers.6  
In 2009, influencer marketing was fringe enough to avoid heavy 
legal scrutiny. As a result, the practice proliferated. When used 
appropriately, the benefits were three-fold: (1) brands were able to 
connect targeted content with the desired demographic; (2) digital 
entrepreneurs were able to fund content and creativity; and  
(3) consumers received more information on products and brands that 
might be of interest. As this practice grew in prominence, however, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) took notice.7  
As the primary US regulator of advertising practices, the FTC’s 
foray into social media marketing was inevitable. Over the last few 
years, the FTC has provided numerous guidance documents on this 
subject, including seminal guidance in the Guides Concerning the Use 
of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (Endorsement 
Guides).8 Fortunately for brands and influencers, the Endorsement 
Guides are not binding law. Consequently, the FTC’s enforcement 




 5. See Kaya Ismail, Social Media Influencers: Mega, Macro, Micro or Nano,  
CMSWIRE (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.cmswire.com/digital-marketing/social-media-influencers-
mega-macro-micro-or-nano/ [https://perma.cc/6CX6-3PHR]. Individuals that possess between one  
thousand to one hundred thousand followers or subscribers and are typically regarded as experts 
in their respective niches are often titled “Micro Influencers.” Id.  
 6. See Barrett Wissman, Micro-Influencers: The Marketing Force of the Future?, FORBES 
(Mar. 2, 2018, 9:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/barrettwissman/2018/03/02/micro-influenc-
ers-the-marketing-force-of-the-future/#52e10df86707 [https://perma.cc/5SEX-G63X]; Danny  
Parisi, 11 Honoré Embraces Micro-Influencers, GLOSSY (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.glossy.co/ 
fashion/amid-budget-cuts-11-honore-embraces-micro-influencers [https://perma.cc/Q69G-3CLH].  
 7. FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMM’N FILE NO. P204500, STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER 
ROHIT CHOPRA REGARDING THE ENDORSEMENT GUIDES REVIEW 2–3 (2020), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
system/files/documents/public_statements/1566445/p204500_-_endorsement_guides_reg_re-
view_-_chopra_stmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W58-Y8SK]. 
 8. FTC Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 
16 C.F.R. § 255 (2020). 
 9. Advertisement Endorsements, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/media-resources/truth-advertising/advertisement-endorsements [https://perma.cc/6833-
U5M8] (last visited Dec. 4, 2020) (“there are no civil penalties associated with [the endorsement 
guides]. But if advertisers don’t follow the guides, the FTC may decide to investigate whether the 
practices are unfair or deceptive under the FTC Act.”); A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade  
Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
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minimal.10 Although the Endorsement Guides lack the punitive punch 
of other FTC enforcement subjects,11 these Guides are pivotal given the 
need for flexibility vis-à-vis ever-changing technology.  
Recently, despite brands’ and influencers’ growing comfort and 
understanding of the existing regulatory framework, the FTC abruptly 
sought to change the rules of the game and raise the stakes. On 
February 12, 2020, the FTC requested comments to a proposal that 
enhances its enforcement authority over influencer marketing and 
increases the penalties.12 This proposal was accompanied by a 
statement from FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra that was highly 
critical of the current influencer marketing enforcement regimes.13 
Chopra argues that “[f]ake accounts, fake likes, fake followers, and fake 
reviews are now polluting the digital economy, making it difficult for 
families and small businesses looking for truthful information.”14 The 
request for comments to the proposal was unanimously approved by the 
FTC.15 One of the primary goals of the proposal is to “determine 
whether to create new requirements for social media platforms and 
advertisers and whether to activate civil penalty liability,”16 essentially 
seeking to end the light-handed regulatory approach that has governed 
under the Endorsement Guides.  
This Article examines the proliferation of social media 
influencer marketing and the FTC’s response. Instead of increasing 
regulation and penalties, as proposed in the FTC’s February 12, 2020, 
proposal and statement, this Article suggests that the risk of social 
media influencer marketing misleading or deceiving consumers is 
minimal and generally outweighed by the benefits of the practice as a 
 
(Oct. 2019) [hereinafter FTC Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority], 
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/7SGD-Y5ZS]. 
 10. Cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(A), 53, 57(b) (authorizing the FTC to commence civil suits 
for unfair methods of competition, false advertising, and deceptive acts). 
 11. See The FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/ftcs-endorsement-guides-what-people-
are-asking [https://perma.cc/SGU9-UZEJ] (last updated Aug. 27, 2020); Enforcement, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement [https://perma.cc/2FTK-YKS6] (last visited Dec. 4, 2020) 
(“The FTC administers a wide variety of laws and regulations, including the Federal Trade  
Commission Act, Telemarketing Sale Rule, Identity Theft Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, and 
Clayton Act. In total, the Commission has enforcement or administrative responsibilities under 
more than 70 laws.”). 
 12. FTC Seeks Public Comment on Its Endorsement Guides, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 12, 
2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/02/ftc-seeks-public-comment-its-en-
dorsement-guides [https://perma.cc/2MYY-EFUR]. 
 13. Id.; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 1. 
 14. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 2. 
 15. FTC Seeks Public Comment on Its Endorsement Guides, supra note 12. 
 16. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 1. 
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whole. This Article also suggests that the technology employed by these 
influencers fluctuates too often to be governed by a rigid, binding legal 
framework with harsh penalties for noncompliance. As a result, a 
lighter regulatory approach from the FTC is warranted.  
II. RISE OF THE INFLUENCERS 
If you could turn your social media use into $40,000–$100,000 
annually, would you be interested?17 Sure, it would take some work to 
build up a following, but with around ten to fifty thousand followers, 
this kind of money would not be unrealistic.18 With these numbers, it is 
no wonder that influencer marketing has “turned into a bona fide career 
path.”19 In today’s lexicon, “influencers” are consumers who promote 
products to their followers on social media.20 However, the concept of 
“influencer marketing” has been around as long as there have been 
celebrities and athletes willing to push products to their fans. In fact, 
most of the laws that are applicable to this practice were created for 
television, radio, and print endorsements.21 As consumer media 
consumption has changed, television, radio, and print endorsements 
have lost some of their effectiveness, and brands have looked for  
ways to connect with an increasingly distracted audience. Rather than 
watching live network television and the corresponding commercials, 
consumers are now primarily consuming content from their phones.22 
This makes it more difficult for brands to reach consumers through 
traditional media.23 Brands needed a way to get commercial messages 
to consumers where they were spending most of their time, namely on 
social media.24 Thus, influencer marketing, as we know it today, was 
 
 17. See Lieber, supra note 4 (“People with smaller followings [who are known as  
nanoinfluencers] can make between $30,000 and $60,000 a year. The micro-influencers can make 
anywhere from $40,000 to $100,000. Celeb influencers make way, way more.”). 
 18. See id.  
 19. See id. 
 20. See Dianne Esber & Jane Wong, Discussions in Digital: Influencer Marketing Is Ready 
for Its Close-Up, MCKINSEY & CO. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.Mckinsey.Com/Business-Func-
tions/Marketing-And-Sales/Our-Insights/Discussions-In-Digital-Influencer-Marketing-Is-Ready-
For-Its-Close-Up [https://perma.cc/BJ26-FHDD]. 
 21. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Endorsements and Testimonials 
Guide, Address at the American Conference Institute’s Regulatory Summit for Advertisers and 
Marketers (June 25, 2009); FTC Seeks Public Comment on Its Endorsement Guides, supra note 12. 
 22. See Giselle Abramovich, 4 Consumer Trends That Are Revolutionizing Content  
Consumption, ADOBE BLOG (Sept. 7, 2017), https://cmo.adobe.com/articles/2017/9/media-and-en-
tertainment-study-on-consumer-behavior-adi-.html#gs.e4h8hd [https://perma.cc/FB8C-9J4K? 
type=image]. 
 23. See id.  
 24. See id. 
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born. Influencer marketing began to evolve with the advent of social 
media. Suddenly, people who were “famous for nothing”25 could earn 
thousands of dollars for posting about products on their social media 
pages,26 and popular teenage social media influencers are starring in 
Super Bowl ads.27   
These days, companies spend significant percentages of their 
annual advertising budgets on influencer marketing. Indeed, it is 
estimated that brands will spend $15 billion by 2022 on influencer 
marketing.28 Pre-Pandemic estimates for 2020 forecasted the online 
advertising market to be upwards of $2.5 billion on Instagram  
alone.29 Brands experienced equally impressive results from influencer 
marketing—one study of European consumers across thirty product 
areas and more than one hundred brands found that, in 2014, social 
media recommendations induced an average of 26 percent of all 
purchases.30 That figure was up 10 percent from the previous year.31  
As with all types of advertising, the COVID-19 Pandemic has 
impacted influencer marketing; however, influencer marketing has 
shown to be one of the more resilient forms of advertising during the 
Pandemic.32 While influencer marketing spend is predicted to be down 
 
 25. See Sheila Marikar, Top 5 Celebrities Famous for . . . Nothing, ABC NEWS (June 5, 
2009, 7:13 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/CelebrityCafe/story?id=7762876&page=1 
[https://perma.cc/U4N7-TUNF]. 
 26. See Seamus Kirst, The Kardashian’s Social Media Influence, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2015, 
6:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/seamuskirst/2015/12/17/the-kardashians-social-media-in-
fluence/#2eadcec61f03 [https://perma.cc/RA3C-QNJ5]; Erica Gonzales, Kris Jenner Reveals How 
Much Her Famous Daughters Get Paid for Sponsored Instagram Posts, HARPER’S BAZAAR (Apr. 17, 
2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.harpersbazaar.com/celebrity/latest/a27171148/kardashian-family-
pay-sponspored-instagram-post/ [https://perma.cc/3SKU-V9XN]. 
 27. See Kat Tenbarge, Inside the Life of 15-Year-Old Charli D’Amelio, the Most Popular 
Teen on the Internet Who Became the Top TikToker for Her Viral Dances and Hype House  
Membership, INSIDER (Mar. 25, 2020, 10:54 AM), https://www.insider.com/charli-d-amelio-bio-
how-old-tiktok-famous-renegade-super-bowl-2020 [https://perma.cc/QPX2-UTDR]. 
 28. Audrey Schomer, Influencer Marketing: State of the Social Media Influencer Market 
in 2020, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 17, 2019, 2:07 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/influencer-mar-
keting-report [https://perma.cc/ZQP9-YYEG]. 
 29. Paolo Zialcita, FTC Issues Rules for Disclosure of Ads by Social Media Influencers, 
NPR (Nov. 5, 2019, 4:57 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/05/776488326/ftc-issues-rules-for-dis-
closure-of-ads-by-social-media-influencers [https://perma.cc/FC7J-VWCJ]. 
 30. Jacques Bughin, Getting a Sharper Picture of Social Media’s Influence, 
MCKINSEY & CO.: MCKINSEY Q. (July 1, 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-func-
tions/marketing-and-sales/our-insights/getting-a-sharper-picture-of-social-medias-influence 
[https://perma.cc/JXZ5-B4FE]. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Ryan Skinner, How Has the Pandemic Impacted Influencer Marketing?, FORRESTER 
(July 23, 2020), https://go.forrester.com/blogs/how-has-the-pandemic-impacted-influencer- 
marketing/ [https://perma.cc/6F4M-AW2R]; SHAR VANBOSKIRK, TINA MOFFETT, RICK 
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by as much as 20 percent from the previous year as marketing budgets 
are adjusted for changed economics and consumer behavior during  
a pandemic, many businesses see opportunity in social media 
marketing.33 This is especially true as traditional avenues of producing 
content (TV, print, movies) dry up due to (a) the challenge in developing 
large-scale productions during a pandemic and (b) consumers being 
largely confined to their homes.34 During a pandemic, it is much easier 
and safer for influencers to prepare content in their homes with  
their smartphones than for a company to attempt to produce a TV 
commercial with multiple actors and large crews. Additionally, studies 
show that consumers are spending more time on social media during 
the Pandemic.35 Because of these factors, social media advertising may 
end up being the marketing sector least impacted by the Pandemic.36  
Influencer marketing is also enticing to companies because 
social media allows brands to more easily calculate a campaign’s return 
on investment (ROI). Clicks, views, and conversions can be viewed  
and interpreted in near real time. This data is critical for brands to both 
understand their customers and develop content and campaigns that 
are relevant to such customers. If influencers can reach an appropriate 
balance between paid content and personal content, their income (and 
influence) will grow with their audience.37 Compared to traditional 
avenues of paid endorsement work (i.e., becoming a movie star or 
professional athlete), social media endorsement work has a much lower 
barrier of entry thanks to free-to-sign-up social media profiles, easy 
content creation from smart devices, provable ROI and audience, and 
 
PARRISH & BRANDON VERBLOW, FORRESTER, THE 2020 COVID-19 CRISIS WILL STUN US 
MARKETING 6 (2020). 
 33. Skinner, supra note 32; see also Thomas Seal, Barilla Pays Influencers to Peddle Pasta 
Because No One’s Making TV Ads, BLOOMBERG (May 29, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2020-05-30/barilla-pays-influencers-to-peddle-pasta-because-no-one-s-
making-tv-ads [https://perma.cc/F5E6-AZJT]. 
 34. Skinner, supra note 32; see Seal, supra note 33. 
 35. See REED SMITH, AN ANA AND REED SMITH LEGAL GUIDE: THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 
ON BRAND ADVERTISING AND MARKETING 9 (2d ed. 2020), https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspec-
tives/2020/04/an-ana-and-reed-smith-legal-guide-the-impact-of-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/BH76-
TQGM]. 
 36. See Skinner, supra note 32; REED SMITH, supra note 35.  
 37. Sujan Patel, How You Can Build a Powerful Influencer Marketing Strategy in  
2020, BIGCOMMERCE, https://www.bigcommerce.com/blog/influencer-marketing/#executive-sum-
mary [https://perma.cc/JL9G-KRSS] (last visited Dec. 4, 2020); 18 Types of Social Posts to  
Keep Your Followers Interested, INFLUENCER MKTG. HUB (Jan. 11, 2019), https://influencermar-
ketinghub.com/18-types-of-social-posts-to-keep-your-followers-interested/ [https://perma.cc/498L-
M85P]. 
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unlimited reach.38 This has provided an avenue for people who are not 
movie stars or professional athletes to do paid endorsement work with 
brands.  
Influencer marketing eventually found its way to every social 
media platform, with Facebook-owned Instagram leading the way.39 
Even newer platforms, like TikTok, are starting to see more 
promotional activity from influencers and brands.40 Reports estimate 
that one-third of US social media users ages sixteen to thirty-four, or 
25.5 million people, are social media content creators with a following 
that would allow them to be considered “influencers.”41 Over 1.5 million 
of these individuals have already had a paid brand partnership.42   
III. CURRENT REGULATION OF INFLUENCER MARKETING 
In the early years of social media, influencer marketing was 
perceived as a win-win for brands and social media users. Brands found 
new ways to reach consumers and consumers received relevant brand 
messaging. Additionally, influencers could make income and even 
become famous in their own right. Eventually, however, the law caught 
up to social media marketing and, in particular, influencer activity.  
In the past few years, there have been numerous examples of 
investigations, warning letters, complaints, and lawsuits based on 
social media influencer activity.43  
 
 38. See Tim Peterson, ‘The Barrier to Entry Is Zero’: Confessions of a Social Marketing 
Exec on the Crowded Influencer Marketing Market, DIGIDAY (July 19, 2018), https://digi-
day.com/marketing/barrier-entry-zero-confessions-social-marketing-exec-crowded-influencer-
marketing-market/ [https://perma.cc/CR53-RXYD]; Erika Montgomery, How to Find and Evaluate 
Social Media Influencers, THREE GIRLS MEDIA, INC. (July 19, 2019), https://www.threegirlsme-
dia.com/2019/07/19/how-to-find-and-evaluate-social-media-influencers/ [https://perma.cc/W8AC-
TG35]. 
 39. See Lieber, supra note 4; Angela Hausman, The Rise and Fall of the Social Media 
Influencer, MKTG. INSIDER GRP. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://marketinginsidergroup.com/influencer-
marketing/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-social-media-influencer/ [https://perma.cc/9VBC-JTQX]. 




 41. PSFK & CISCO, CONSUMER 2020: CREATING A NEW GENERATION OF RETAIL AND 
EXPERIENCE STRATEGIES 6 (2017), https://www.slideshare.net/PSFK/consumer-2020-77269097 
[https://perma.cc/9DBZ-NRCZ]. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., FTC Staff Reminds Influencers and Brands to Clearly Disclose Relationship, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/04/ftc-
staff-reminds-influencers-brands-clearly-disclose [https://perma.cc/94JA-T7T9]; Letter from  
Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir. for Advert. Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n, on Cole Haan, FTC  
File No. 142-3041 to Christie Thompson (Mar. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Cole Haan  
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Social media, and in particular influencer marketing, has proven 
difficult to regulate. There is not an individual source of law applicable 
to influencer marketing, and the existing laws were created long  
before the advent of today’s social media platforms. Brands and their 
influencers—typically lay individuals without any formal legal 
training—were suddenly expected to navigate a web of advertising, 
endorsement, promotion, contract, and intellectual property laws  
and regulations—many of which do not adequately address the 
practicalities of social media.44 This has been further complicated by the 
fact that social media is constantly evolving and rules are irregularly 
enforced. New platforms are frequently introduced while existing 
platforms introduce novel functionalities, and influencers, brands, and 
regulators all have to evaluate these changes in real time. For example, 
as soon as the FTC begins to get comfortable with Instagram, brands 
start engaging with influencers on TikTok.45   
Despite the aforementioned challenges, the FTC has been 
actively cracking down on influencer activity. Recently, the agency  
has initiated enforcement actions against influencer marketers.46  
The FTC’s enforcement actions against influencer marketing have 
traditionally analogized paid social media content to “endorsements.”47 
As such, the FTC primarily uses the 2009 Endorsement Guides as  
the framework for lawful influencer marketing.48 The Endorsement 
Guides were first issued in 1975 and were applied to endorsements  
in traditional media.49 In 2009, the Endorsement Guides were 
substantially updated for the internet age to address online reviews and 
 
Letter], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/closing_letters/cole-haan-inc./140320colehaan 
closingletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/MYN9-QWBN]; Lord & Taylor, LLC, No. C-4576, at *1–3 (F.T.C. 
May 20, 2016) (complaint); Lesley Fair, FTC’s Teami Case: Spilling the Tea About Influencers and 
Advertisers, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 6, 2020, 11:22 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/business-blog/2020/03/ftcs-teami-case-spilling-tea-about-influencers-advertisers 
[https://perma.cc/Q422-8CPZ]; CSGO Lotto Owners Settle FTC’s First-Ever Complaint Against  
Individual Social Media Influencers, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 7, 2017) [hereinafter CSGO Lotto 
Owners Settle], https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/09/csgo-lotto-owners-settle-
ftcs-first-ever-complaint-against [https://perma.cc/7KD6-EYTJ]. 
 44. See Enforcement, supra note 11; Andrew Contiguglia, Top 5 Legal Concerns for  
Influencers on Social Media, CONTIGUGLIA L. FIRM: BLOG (June 17, 2020), https://contigug-
lia.com/blog/legal-concerns-for-influencers-on-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/REL4-DE4G]. 
 45. See, e.g., Flora, supra note 40.  
 46. See Lesley Fair, Three FTC Actions of Interest to Influencers, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(Sept. 7, 2017, 11:11 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/09/three-ftc-
actions-interest-influencers [https://perma.cc/BK94-LU5Z].  
 47. See The FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking, supra note 11.  
 48. See id. 
 49. Rosch, supra note 21.  
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bloggers.50 During the early years of social media influencer marketing, 
the FTC applied the blogging provisions of the Endorsement Guides to 
social media.51 This position was confirmed and bolstered by the  
FTC’s recent 2019 guidance document, which specifically applied the 
Endorsement Guides to social media influencers and reiterated the 
need for “clear and conspicuous” disclosures.52   
The Endorsement Guides (and other FTC guidance documents 
on the subject) are not binding law; they are merely guidance to help 
social marketers avoid violating the FTC’s general Section 5 “deceptive 
practices” authority.53 Thus, violating the Endorsement Guides is not 
per se illegal, but violations are pursued by the FTC as deceptive 
practices.54 Section 5 of the FTC Act gives the FTC the authority to 
enforce Congress’s prohibition against deceptive business practices.55 
To show that a defendant has acted with deception in violation of 
Section 5, the FTC must establish three elements: (1) there was a 
material representation, omission, or practice; (2) the representation, 
omission, or practice was likely to mislead consumers; and (3) the 
consumers were acting reasonably under the circumstances.56 The 
 
 50. See FTC Publishes Final Guides Governing Endorsements, Testimonials, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Oct. 5, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/10/ftc-publishes-final-
guides-governing-endorsements-testimonials [https://perma.cc/B279-DMJW]. 
 51. See Gregory A. Nylen, Social Media Influencers as Endorsers: Pitfalls and Best  
Practices to Avoid the Ire of the FTC, ORANGE CNTY. LAW., Apr. 2020, at 37, 38. 
 52. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2020); FTC Releases Advertising Disclosures Guidance for Online 
Influencers, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re-
leases/2019/11/ftc-releases-advertising-disclosures-guidance-online-influencers [https://perma.cc/ 
9MDU-22RV]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, DISCLOSURES 101 FOR SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS 2  
(2019) [hereinafter DISCLOSURES 101], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-lan-
guage/1001a-influencer-guide-508_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3DQ-4ZLZ]. 
 53. See The FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking, supra note 11. Congress 
originally created the agency to enforce the antitrust laws through the FTC Act of 1914 but later 
added consumer protection issues to its portfolio in 1938 when Congress expanded the agency’s 
authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act to prohibit “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” See 
Robert Freer, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address Before the Annual Convention of  
the Proprietary Association: The Wheeler-Lea Act (May 17, 1938); see also FTC v. 
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972). 
 54. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0 (2020). “Deceptive” practices are defined in the Commission’s Policy 
Statement on Deception as involving a material representation, omission, or practice that is likely 
to mislead a consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances. Letter from James C. Miller III, 
Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Hon. John D. Dingell, Chairman, House Comm.  
on Energy & Com. (Oct. 14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_state-
ments/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ67-BDPD]. An act or practice is  
“unfair” if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably 
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers 
or to competition.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).  
 55. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2). 
 56. See, e.g., FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 124 F. Supp. 2d 193, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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guidance documents have instructed and governed social media 
marketing for the last ten years, and the FTC has become adept in 
applying the guidance documents in enforcement actions targeting the 
influencer marketing industry.57   
As violations of the Endorsement Guides are pursued under  
the FTC’s general Section 5 enforcement, the FTC’s enforcement 
attempts typically proceed in three stages: (1) inquiry and 
investigation; (2) consent order; and (3) if necessary, an administrative 
or judicial proceeding.58 Any FTC investigation originates from a 
government request, a public complaint, or through the FTC’s  
own monitoring processes.59 The FTC may then initiate either an  
informal inquiry to explore the veracity and severity of the potential  
infraction, or instead move directly to a formal investigation.60 At this  
stage, the FTC seeks information by issuing informal requests or  
compulsory process, such as subpoenas and civil investigative demands  
(CIDs).61 Target companies may or may not be notified of the FTC’s 
investigation.62  
If the FTC concludes that the target company violated certain 
regulations, it will then move to the second stage. During the second 
stage, the FTC usually issues written notifications to the company, 
which include a draft complaint and a proposed consent order.63 The 
consent order provides the target company with an opportunity to settle 
the charges before the FTC files the complaint and without an 
admission of liability.64 Settlement terms in the consent order vary from 
case to case, but they typically include FTC monitoring for up to  
 
 57. The FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking, supra note 11; see, e.g., 
sources cited supra note 43.  
 58. See FTC Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, supra note 9. 
The FTC can opt to pursue either an administrative adjudication or judicial enforcement when 
bringing a Section 5 enforcement action. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(b), 53(a)–(b). Administrative  
adjudication provides advantages to the FTC and thus “the FTC typically opts for the  
administrative process, particularly when faced with unique, fact-driven cases.” See Timothy E. 
Deal, Note, Moving Beyond “Reasonable”: Clarifying the FTC’s Use of Its Unfairness Authority in 
Data Security Enforcement Actions, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2227, 2237 (2016). 
 59. See Mark Eichorn, If the FTC Comes to Call, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 20,  
2015, 10:51 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2015/05/if-ftc-comes-call 
[https://perma.cc/9UTB-KKF4]. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1(c)(1). 
 62. See id. 
 63. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.31–2.34 (2020); FTC Investigative, Law Enforcement, and  
Rulemaking Authority, supra note 9; see, e.g., Turn Inc., No. 152 3099, at *2–3 (F.T.C. Dec. 20, 
2016) (decision and order).  
 64. FTC Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, supra note 9. 
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twenty years and a ban on future similar misconduct.65 The FTC  
cannot administratively impose civil penalties for violations of the 
Endorsement Guides under general Section 5 “deceptive practices” 
authority but may for violations of consent orders, FTC rules, or court 
orders.66  
Judicial and administrative proceedings, the third stage, occur 
when the company declines to settle the complaint by consent order.67 
At this point, the FTC may seek injunctions, civil penalties in specific 
cases, and other damages.68 Most enforcement actions for influencer 
marketing in violation of the Endorsement Guides are resolved by 
consent order, with the brand, agency, or influencer agreeing to 
monitoring and compliance without substantial civil or criminal 
penalties.69 For first-time offenders, this typically means that monetary 
penalties can be avoided.70 
Under the Endorsement Guides, the FTC takes the position that 
primary compliance responsibility rests with the brand sponsoring the 
message or post.71 It is the brand’s duty to ensure influencers utilize 
proper notices, despite the fact that the influencer is the one posting the 
content on his or her personal page.72 Brands and influencers often 
struggle with the Endorsement Guides because the mandates are often 
at odds with the desires of modern marketing departments and the 
realities of social media.73 Brands increasingly value authenticity  
and strive for “grassroots” campaigns.74 Under the FTC’s guidelines, 
 
 65. See, e.g., GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. 94, 123–32 (1999) (decision and order); BJ’s Wholesale 
Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 470–72 (2005) (decision and order); Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade 
Commission and Privacy: Defining Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 
48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 834 (2011); Deal, supra note 58, at 2240; Gerard M.  
Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and Data Security: The FTC’s Hidden 
Data-Security Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 690–91 (2013). 
 66. Advertisement Endorsements, supra note 9; 15 U.S.C. § 45(m); Stegmaier & Bartnick, 
supra note 65. 
 67. FTC Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, supra note 9. 
 68. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b); FTC Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking  
Authority, supra note 9. 
 69. See Laura E. Bladow, Note, Worth the Click: Why Greater FTC Enforcement Is Needed 
to Curtail Deceptive Practices in Influencer Marketing, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 1153–54, 
1159–60 (2018). 
 70. See Veronica N. Ramirez, Note, Fashion Statements Turned Endorsements: How FTC 
Enforcement Could Cripple the Internet’s Trendsetters, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 483, 492 (2018). 
 71. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.1 (2020). 
 72. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2020). 
 73. See Squire Patton Boggs, Spreading the Influence: FTC Issues New Guidance for  
Influencers, LEXOLOGY: GLOB. BUS. IP & TECH. BLOG (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/li-
brary/detail.aspx?g=97d0a0bf-f4ec-41fb-95f8-e6487e3c3e5b [https://perma.cc/WKN7-WUEJ]. 
 74. See Pamela N. Danziger, How Retailers Big and Small Can Activate Grassroots  
Influencers on Social Media, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2019, 11:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
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however, influencers must disclose—within the post itself—when they 
are paid for a post or receive a product for free or at a discounted price, 
regardless of whether the influencer would have felt the same way if 
the product was purchased by the individual.75 Further, a specific  
social media platform’s functionality may make appropriate disclosure 
difficult or impossible. This was evident with Twitter’s character 
limits—only so much disclosure is possible in Twitter’s original  
140-character limit. The FTC reacted to this issue by recommending 
influencers include #Ad or #Sponsored in the post—much to the disdain 
of creatives everywhere.76 Even these simple recommendations can be 
difficult in practice, however, as brands must find a way to control their 
numerous influencers across various platforms, who are sometimes 
unaware of the FTC’s guidelines or even that they are making an 
“endorsement.”77 
This was the case when the FTC admonished Cole Haan, a 
footwear purveyor, for soliciting Pinterest “endorsements” from the 
general public without satisfactory disclosures.78 Cole Haan ran a 
promotion on Pinterest in which the contest rules instructed entrants 
to create Pinterest boards that included images of Cole Haan shoes and 
used the hashtag “#WanderingSole” in each pin description for a  
chance to win a $1,000 shopping spree.79 These posts did not come from 
influencers as the classification is typically understood but rather 
individual consumers trying to win a contest.80 Despite this, the FTC 
took the position that “participants’ pins featuring Cole Haan products 
were endorsements of the Cole Haan products, and the fact that the 
pins were incentivized by the opportunity to win a $1,000 shopping 
spree would not reasonably be expected by consumers who saw the 
pins,” and thus, the posts were all deceptive endorsements.81 
Since this was an issue of first impression for the FTC, the  
FTC decided not to pursue an enforcement action against Cole  
Haan but rather stated that it expects “that Cole Haan will take  
reasonable steps to monitor social media influencers’ compliance with 
 
pamdanziger/2019/03/06/how-retailers-big-and-small-can-activate-grassroots-influencers-on-so-
cial-media/#7ae58af96309 [https://perma.cc/ACA3-AW8V] (defining grassroots influencers as “real 
people sharing their real-world experiences with a retailer or a brand”); Francesca Nicasio, The 
Age of Authentic Marketing: A Guide to Gain Consumer Trust, POWER REVS., https://www.power-
reviews.com/blog/authentic-marketing/ [https://perma.cc/Y5JE-B2W7] (last visited Dec. 6, 2020). 
 75. See Boggs, supra note 73. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See, e.g., infra Part III (discussing the Lord & Taylor campaign). 
 78. See Cole Haan Letter, supra note 43. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
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the obligation to disclose material connections when endorsing its 
products” and ultimately “reserve[d] the right to take further action as 
the public interest may warrant.”82  
Similarly, in 2016, the FTC censured clothing retailer 
Lord & Taylor for paying fifty fashion influencers to post Instagram 
pictures of themselves wearing the same dress but failing to ensure that 
the compensation and the resulting “material connection”83 were 
disclosed to the influencers’ followers.84 The campaign was ultimately 
very successful—the dress sold out on the strength of the campaign’s 
reach to 11.4 million Instagram users, which, in turn, resulted in over 
320,000 unique brand engagements or interactions with consumers  
and potential consumers.85 The FTC was displeased with the lack  
of disclosures and held Lord & Taylor responsible.86 Lord & Taylor 
ultimately settled the matter, and the FTC issued an enforcement 
policy statement.87 The statement confirmed the FTC’s position that:  
an ad’s format is deceptive if it materially misleads consumers about the ad’s 
commercial nature, including through any implied or express representation that it 
comes from a party other than the sponsoring advertiser. If the source of advertising 
content is clear, consumers can make informed decisions about whether to interact 
with the advertising and the weight to give the information conveyed in the ad.88 
More recently, the FTC settled another case with Teami, LLC, a 
purveyor of health- and beauty-focused tea products.89 The FTC’s initial 
complaint alleged that Teami made misleading claims about the weight 
loss and health benefits of its products, in addition to paying influencers 
for endorsements that were not properly disclosed.90 The Commission 
had previously demanded Teami’s advertisements maintain disclosures 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. DISCLOSURES 101, supra note 52 (“A ‘material connection’ to the brand includes a  
personal, family, or employment relationship or a financial relationship – such as the brand paying 
you or giving you free or discounted products or services.”).  
 84. Lord & Taylor, LLC, No. C-4576, at *1–3 (F.T.C. May 20, 2016) (complaint).  
 85. Lord & Taylor Settles FTC Charges It Deceived Consumers Through Paid Article in an 
Online Fashion Magazine and Paid Instagram Posts by 50 “Fashion Influencers,” FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/03/lord-taylor-set-
tles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-through [https://perma.cc/MP4S-AM8J].  
 86. See id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. FTC Issues Enforcement Policy Statement Addressing “Native” Advertising  
and Deceptively Formatted Advertisements, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 22, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/ftc-issues-enforcement-policy-statement-
addressing-native [https://perma.cc/TP49-QC2A].  
 89. Fair, supra note 43.  
 90. Id.; see also Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 17, 
FTC v. Teami, LLC, No. 8:20-cv-00518 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2020) [hereinafter Teami Complaint]. 
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that are “clear and conspicuous.”91 The FTC maintained that 
disclosures require unambiguous language that can be easily noticed 
and understood by consumers.92 The FTC also noted a particular 
characteristic of Instagram: users typically only see the first few lines 
unless they click “more.”93 To prevent obscuring the disclosures, the 
FTC required endorsers to disclose any material connection above the 
“more” link.94  
The Teami example, in particular, illustrates some of the 
technical and creative difficulties in complying with the Endorsement 
Guides. For Teami, disclosure itself was not enough. The disclosure had 
to be “above the fold” as specifically applied to Instagram posts.95 
Furthermore, modern social media platforms emphasize video and 
livestreaming over text. How would this “above the fold” requirement 
apply to livestreaming? It is difficult to translate the “clear and 
conspicuous” disclosure requirement from the Endorsement Guides’ 
blogging examples to modern, video-centric platforms like TikTok and 
Twitch.96 While those platforms offer functionalities like text overlay, 
which would allow for certain disclosures, the FTC has shown that  
it takes a very nuanced approach to the “clear and conspicuous” 
requirements for disclosures, yet it has not provided clear and  
specific requirements for disclosures in such contexts. What’s more,  
there has recently been a surge in popularity of content-sharing  
platforms that require paid registration (e.g., OnlyFans).97 These  
paid or registration-required sites pose additional challenges to FTC 
investigation and enforcement of endorsement compliance. The FTC’s 
guidelines fail to provide adequate specificity to account for the 
intricacies present in contemporary social media channels and related 
advertising strategies. 
 
 91. See Fair, supra note 43.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.; see also Teami Complaint, supra note 90, at 13.  
 95. See Fair, supra note 43.   
 96. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 255.5, ex. 7 (2020). The website influencer examples in the  
Guidelines primarily cover bloggers. See id. § 255.1, ex. 5, § 255.5, ex. 7. In the blogging examples, 
the FTC simply recommends adding text to the blog post to “clearly and conspicuously disclose” 
the connection. Id. 
 97. See How It Works, ONLYFANS, onlyfans.com/how [https://perma.cc/5535-PEXN] (last 
visited Dec. 6, 2020); see also Seren Morris, What Is OnlyFans, Who Uses It and How Does It Work?, 
NEWSWEEK (July 23, 2020, 11:47 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/what-who-how-only-fans-so-
cial-media-platform-content-creators-1520001 [https://perma.cc/H344-NBUN].  
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IV. PROPOSED EXPANSION OF REGULATION AND PENALTIES 
Despite the difficulties and limitations of the current regulatory 
framework, its application over the last decade has allowed brands  
and influencers to anticipate how the rules will be enforced and the 
potential risks of noncompliance. However, shortly after the ten-year 
anniversary of the modern Endorsement Guides, the FTC released  
a proposal to enhance its enforcement and penalty capabilities in 
connection with influencer marketing.98 In February 2020, the FTC 
requested public comment on proposals to strengthen the FTC’s 
regulation of influencer marketing.99 As stated in FTC Commissioner 
Rohit Chopra’s proposal, the FTC is concerned that “[m]isinformation 
is plaguing the digital economy, and recent no-money, no-fault FTC 
settlements with well-known retailers and brands to address fake 
reviews and undisclosed influencer endorsements may be doing little to 
deter deception.”100   
Based on this concern, the FTC is pursuing the ability to  
seek civil penalties for violations of the FTC’s Endorsement Guides.101 
Specifically, Commissioner Chopra is considering creating formal rules 
based on the requirements in the Endorsement Guides, which would 
provide the FTC with more punitive actions for violations.102 The  
FTC is also seeking to specify “the requirement that companies must  
adhere to in their contractual arrangements with influencers, including 
through sample terms that companies can include in contracts.”103  
On one hand, the federal government, specifically the FTC and 
other government agencies, plays an important role in protecting 
consumers and prohibiting malicious and clearly deceptive marketing 
in US commerce.104 But with respect to influencer marketing, 
Commissioner Chopra is concerned that the nonbinding guidelines do 
not go far enough to protect consumers and has instead proposed 
 
 98. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 3. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 1. 
 101. Id. at 3. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  
 104. See FTC Wins $5.2 Million Judgment Against Defendants Who Tricked Consumers 
with Ads for Non-Existent Rental Properties and ‘Free’ Credit Reports, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 
5, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/07/ftc-wins-52-million-judgment-
against-defendants-who-tricked [https://perma.cc/LML8-AKNN]; see also Lesley Fair, Violating 
Made in USA Order Lands Filtration Seller in Hot Water, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 17, 2020, 
11:51 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2019/04/violating-made-usa-or-
der-lands-filtration-seller-hot-water [https://perma.cc/N647-625B].  
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harsher penalties under the FTC Act for actual rules violations.105 
Thus, Commissioner Chopra desires to “codify[] elements of the existing 
endorsement guides into formal rules so that violators can be liable for 
civil penalties under Section 5(m)(1)(A) and liable for damages under 
Section 19” instead of relying on the general Section 5 deceptive 
practices authority, which typically results in settlements and consent 
orders without admission of liability.106 Yet, for the reasons discussed 
in this Article,107 the FTC’s proposal to move “beyond the issuance of 
voluntary guidance”108 to instead issue formal rules and seek civil 
penalties for violations is unwarranted and may have unintended 
consequences.  
As this Article discusses in Part V, it is more appropriate for the 
FTC to continue recommending and enforcing best practices through 
the Endorsement Guides and other guidance documents while 
minimizing penalties. This approach would allow brands and 
influencers to continue innovating influencer marketing and increase 
information and content available to consumers. The FTC’s current 
enforcement of the Endorsement Guides is sufficiently capable of 
protecting consumers while allowing the flexibility required for 
innovative technology like social media.  
V. ADEQUATE CONSUMER PROTECTION EXISTS WITHOUT FORMAL 
RULEMAKING AND CIVIL PENALTIES 
The FTC Endorsement Guides call for honest and representative 
statements that are able to be substantiated while barring deceptive or 
misleading claims.109 Specifically, the Endorsement Guides require 
that:  
(i) endorsements reflect the actual opinions or experiences 
of the endorser;110  
(ii) endorsements may not contain any representations that 
would be deceptive, or could not be substantiated, if made 
directly by the advertiser;111 
(iii) an advertisement employing a consumer endorsement  
on a central or key attribute of a product will be 
 
 105. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 3; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(A), 57b. 
 106. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 3; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(A), 57b; see also  
discussion infra Parts V, VI.  
 107. See discussion supra Part IV; discussion infra Part V. 
 108. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 3. 
 109. 16 C.F.R. § 255 (2020).  
 110. Id. § 255.1(a). 
 111. Id.  
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interpreted as representing that the endorser’s 
experience is representative of what consumers will 
generally achieve;112  
(iv) advertisements represented as consumer endorsements 
must cite actual consumers or conspicuously disclose that 
the persons are not actual consumers;113 
(v) endorsements must clearly disclose any connection 
between the endorser and the brand owner “that might 
materially affect the weight or credibility of the 
endorsement.”114  
These requirements may appear straightforward. This was the 
case when they were applied to traditional media or even bloggers. 
However, these requirements can be difficult to implement in the 
context of social media. Specifically, Provision (v), which requires 
parties to fully disclose their connections, creates complications  
for many brands and influencers.115 This requirement is the most 
ambiguous and difficult to understand in the entire social media 
industry.  
Over the last several years, enforcement of Provision (v) has 
taken several shapes, from the Cole Haan endorsement sweepstakes116 
and the Lord & Taylor grassroots campaign117 mentioned in Part III,118 
to issues with employees119 and owners120 posting about their companies 
and products without disclosures. The variety in these enforcement 
actions (all based on the same requirement) illustrates that both  
brands and the FTC must continually evolve their understanding of  
this requirement. As technology and consumer behavior change, these 
enforcements should serve as an example of why rigid laws with harsh 
penalties would be ineffective in an ever-changing and evolving 
industry.  
 
 112. Id. § 255.2(a) (stating that if an advertiser does not have adequate substantiation that 
the endorser’s experience is representative, the advertisement should contain a clear and  
conspicuous disclosure). 
 113. Id. § 255.2(c). 
 114. Id. § 255.5. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Cole Haan Letter, supra note 43. 
 117. Lord & Taylor, LLC, No. C-4576, at *3 (F.T.C. May 20, 2016) (complaint). 
 118. See discussion supra Part III. 
 119. FTC Approves Final Orders Related to False Advertising by Sony Computer  
Entertainment America and Its Ad Agency Deutsch LA for PS Vita Game Console, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/03/ftc-approves-fi-
nal-orders-related-false-advertising-sony-computer [https://perma.cc/796Q-HXG4].  
 120. CSGO Lotto Owners Settle, supra note 43.  
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A. Social Media’s Rapid Evolution Requires a Flexible Approach 
Given the rapid evolution of social media, the flexibility in the 
current regulatory scheme, along with nominal penalties, is necessary. 
The FTC addressed this in The FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What People 
Are Asking guidance document from 2017.121 In this document, the  
FTC attempted to clarify many of the questions that arose as people 
tried to apply the Endorsement Guides to then-innovative social  
media platforms like Twitter and Snapchat.122 The FTC clarified that 
influencers only need to sacrifice three characters (#ad) on Twitter  
and that users need to “superimpose a disclosure on Snapchat” while 
considering “how well [the disclosure] contrasts against the image.”123 
These answers are sufficient (to some extent) for platforms that existed 
in 2017, but what about when new platforms arrive? Who is responsible 
for the appropriate disclosures in a TikTok response video (known as a 
“duet”)?124 What about OnlyFans or augmented reality platforms? It  
is difficult to predict where social media will go in the future, which 
emphasizes the need for flexibility in the rules governing this space.  
There is also an element of self-regulation already built into 
social media marketing, as influencers will often hear from their 
followers if they perceive the influencer to be pushing too much paid 
and branded content.125 Considering the “harm” to consumers (or lack 
thereof) for failure to disclose the material connection, being critiqued 
by your followers seems like a sufficient punishment for most cases. 
Consider the Lord & Taylor case cited by the FTC as a warranted use 
of enforcement power.126 As previously discussed, the retailer paid  
fifty influencers to wear the same dress and post a picture with the 
company’s handle.127 The FTC charged Lord & Taylor with deceiving 
the public by failing to disclose that the company compensated the 
influencers for those posts.128 The FTC then settled the case for  
“no customer refunds, no forfeiture of ill-gotten gains, no notice to 
 
 121. The FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking, supra note 11. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Melanie Weir, How to Duet on TikTok and Record a Video Alongside Someone Else’s, 
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consumers, no deletion of wrongfully obtained personal data, and no 
findings or admission of liability.”129  
What was the harm here to consumers—that they bought a 
dress they might not have otherwise purchased? If that was the case, 
would a disclosure have changed their minds? If the product itself  
was defective for some reason, should that liability rest with the 
manufacturer or retailer rather than with the person that made a  
post about it online? If the pictures of the dress had been viewed in  
the Lord & Taylor catalogue or during a commercial rather than on 
Instagram, would the purchasers have made a different decision? The 
influencers were clearly wearing the dress in the posts and complied 
with all of the other requirements in the Endorsement Guides but just 
not the final endorsement connection disclosure requirement under 16 
C.F.R. § 255.5.130 Considering the lack of actual injury to customers by 
the influencer—financial or otherwise—the brand’s publicity damage 
paired with FTC threats is sufficient recourse. Because of the absence 
of actual injury to consumers, significant monetary liability imposed by 
the FTC was unnecessary.131 
Commissioner Chopra argues that enhanced enforcement and 
penalties are necessary because “when companies launder advertising 
by paying someone for a seemingly authentic endorsement or review, 
this is illegal payola.”132 However, Commissioner Chopra’s statement 
also admits that “[w]hen individual influencers are able to post about 
their interests to earn extra money on the side, this is not a cause for 
major concern.”133 This dichotomy illustrates the lack of uniformity in 
assessing influencer behavior and the difficulty in assessing blame. 
Accordingly, the existing light-handed framework is a more appropriate 
way to address this kind of conduct than harsh civil penalties.  
B. Consumer Perception Has Evolved and Paid Content on Social 
Media Is Readily Recognized 
As social media platforms gained prominence, users were not 
always able to tell whether an influencer was compensated for a post or 
whether it was an organic endorsement.134 However, consumers have 
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now lived with Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram for nearly a  
decade.135 Today, social media users are largely perceptive digital 
consumers who are easily able to differentiate “between an advert, a 
personal recommendation, and an advert masked under a personal 
recommendation.”136 This suggests that consumers may not be as 
misled by influencer marketing as the FTC believes. 
Influencers who (1) use the products they promote; (2) provide 
only truthful claims that are inherently free of deception; and  
(3) disclose material facts around their use of the product (even if there 
is not a clear Provision (v) connection disclosure) are arguably not 
harming consumers with posts about the product. There is ample data 
showing that the presence or absence of a connection between the 
influencer and the brand does not materially affect the weight or 
credibility of the endorsement and, therefore, does not need to  
be disclosed.137 Social media users already understand trends of  
social media marketing and can recognize an influencer’s post when  
they see one.138 Studies have shown that a material connection 
disclosure neither positively nor negatively impacts a consumer’s 
perception of a brand.139 Furthermore, brands that work with  
more recognized “mega-influencers” (i.e., those with 10 million  
or more followers) average reduced rates of social engagement  
(likes and comments on their posts).140 Experts estimate that the  
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“mega-influencers” get “tuned out the same way we skip commercials 
or other traditional advertising.”141 This evidence illustrates that the 
“material connection” between the brand and influencer is unlikely  
to materially affect the weight of an endorsement in the minds of 
consumers, and even if it does have an effect, it is likely to be negative.  
In fact, creating laws that come with steep civil penalties for 
marketing activities in the ever-changing social media ecosystem could 
be interpreted as a direct violation of the FTC’s mission to act “without 
unduly burdening legitimate business activity.”142 Some studies have 
found that influencer marketing is actually beneficial to consumers, 
with one citing that “over 50% of [social media] users prefer getting 
product information from influencers and other users rather than 
straight from brands or advertising.”143 There is also evidence that 
“regulation is bad for followers, who suffer from the decline in the 
quality of advice.144 The regulation is bad for marketers, who observe 
lower levels of engagement with their paid content, and it is bad for 
influencers, who receive lower pay from marketers.”145 
Today’s consumers are accustomed to and prepared for paid 
content from many sources, even if disclosures are not present. For 
example, consumers frequently see paid “product placement,” the act  
of embedding and displaying products or brands, in television and 
movies.146 The FTC has taken the position that product placement in 
entertainment content is different from sponsored content and “doesn’t 
require a disclosure that the advertiser paid for the placement.”147 In 
2015, a study reported that an estimated 85 percent of people watching 
a television show notice and recognize product placement.148 As with 
product placement in movies or television, the vast majority of social 
media users also understand when a product is being endorsed and only 
follow a specific influencer because they “‘just like looking at their posts’ 
 
 141. Micro Influencer Marketing 101: Why Bigger Isn’t Always Better, supra note 140. 
 142. Cf. About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc 
[https://perma.cc/E9MJ-JCBL] (last visited Dec. 6, 2020) (stating that the FTC’s mission is to  
prevent “anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices through law enforcement,  
advocacy, and education without unduly burdening legitimate business activity”).  
 143. Gotter, supra note 137.  
 144. Internet Experts Who Attract Paid Advertisers Run the Risk of Alienating ‘Followers,’ 
supra note 134. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Will Kenton, Product Placement, INVESTOPEDIA (July 4, 2020), https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/p/product-placement.asp [https://perma.cc/CMR7-NQ33]. 
 147. The FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking, supra note 11.  
 148. Faith Saucier, Product Placement: Do You Believe in Magic?, PLATFORM MAG. (Mar. 6, 
2020, 5:48 PM), https://platformmagazine.org/2020/03/06/product-placement-do-you-believe-in-
magic/ [https://perma.cc/75XS-RZ9C]. 
2021] REGULATION OF INFLUENCER MARKETING 275 
while only 29% said they have made a purchase based on an influencer 
post.”149 Does the FTC really believe that consumers are capable of 
identifying product placement in film and television but not on social 
media? Is Instagram not largely “entertainment content” like film  
and television?150 The amount of time users are spending on such  
apps would suggest that it is entertainment content.151 It would be 
inconsistent to treat product placement in movies and television 
differently from an influencer’s creative and heavily curated Instagram 
page. In fact, the FTC partially makes the argument against forced 
disclosure under this analogy in the agency’s provided Example 2 to 
Section 255.5 of the Endorsement Guides.152 
Example 2: A film star endorses a particular food product. The endorsement regards 
only points of taste and individual preference. This endorsement must, of course, 
comply with § 255.1; but regardless of whether the star’s compensation for the 
commercial is a $1 million cash payment or a royalty for each product sold by the 
advertiser during the next year, no disclosure is required because such payments 
likely are ordinarily expected by viewers.153 
As traditional modes of advertising lose effectiveness, paid social 
media content is becoming the new norm. Consumers know and expect 
to see these posts. In the words of the FTC example above, influencers’ 
endorsements are “ordinarily expected by viewers.”154 
Furthermore, even if consumers do not initially recognize paid 
content, there are many sources of product reviews and product 
information freely available online from which consumers can quickly 
and easily get a second opinion before any purchase.155 In these 
scenarios, consumers not only recognize paid content but there is also 
evidence that the required disclosures are beginning to disrupt the 
social media experience, causing what has been called “influencer 
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fatigue.”156 This fatigue erodes the trust that consumers have in 
influencers. In 2019, it was reported that “only 4% of people believe that 
information shared by influencers on social media is true.”157 Not  
only does this demonstrate that consumers are keenly aware that social 
media includes paid content but it also shows that consumers are  
not substantially influenced by influencer posts. Instead, the required 
disclosures and disclaimers have disrupted the social media experience 
for many users. Civil liabilities and additional mandated disclosures 
under Section 255.5 would likely exacerbate influencer fatigue.  
The Harvard Business Review has expressly stated that “in any 
particular year, disclosure makes almost no difference to the impact  
of the influencer’s recommendation on the purchase decision.”158 In 
essence, most social media users are going to believe what they want to 
believe, and the presence or absence of a mandated disclosure likely 
does little to change this fact. 
This evidence refutes some of the primary reasoning in the 
Commissioner’s statement for harsher penalties.159 In the February  
12, 2020, statement, Commissioner Chopra argues for increased 
accountability by stating that “[f]ake accounts, fake likes, fake 
followers, and fake reviews are now polluting the digital economy, 
making it difficult for families and small businesses looking for truthful 
information.”160 But if influencers genuinely like the products they are 
paid to post and modern consumers are not particularly swayed by 
influencer content, can easily compare reviews and obtain second 
opinions online, and buy things they think they will like, does  
the absence of a material connection disclosure really “pollute the 
digital economy?” With mounting evidence showing the limited effect 
influencer disclosures have on consumer decision-making, along with 
the growing expectation of social media users that influencer posts are 
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sponsored, the FTC’s proposal for enhanced enforcement and penalties 
is both belated and unnecessary.161 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Social media influencer advertising provides a new means for 
brands to reach consumers in the modern era. As consumers become 
more aware of this practice, some might be annoyed by paid content 
while others may appreciate the targeted recommendations. Yet, very 
few consumers are tricked or manipulated by such content and even 
fewer are substantially damaged by it.  
While the existing regulatory framework for influencer 
marketing is not perfect, its light-handed, flexible approach allows  
for brands and influencers to participate without fear of substantial 
penalties. If the FTC enhances the potential penalties, as proposed in 
Commissioner Chopra’s February 12, 2020, statement, the risks will 
substantially outweigh the rewards and this novel and, at times, useful 
form of advertising may cease to exist. Influencers will slowly become 
extinct due to burdensome regulatory schemes and increased liability. 
As traditional forms of advertising decline, consumers will suffer from 
a lack of brand and product knowledge, brands will suffer from a lack 
of exposure, and social media users will lose a valuable revenue stream. 
The FTC occasionally reevaluates its rules and considers revising them 
to apply to the modern construct.162 Here, perhaps a reevaluation is 
appropriate, but the goal should be to simplify the regulations and ease 
potential penalties rather than to enhance enforcement as was recently 
proposed by the FTC. 
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